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Abstract
The outcome of trade policies to increase access for foreign firms to
the home country's market is shown to be sensitive to the implementa-
tion procedure used. The importance of the timing of moves between
government and firms is highlighted by focusing on taxes and subsi-
dies to implement minimum market share requirements. Both taxes
and subsidies chosen by the home government after firms have picked
prices, create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices - effects that
are similar in nature to those found with quotas/VERso We show that
some degree of imprecision in implementing the target engenders less
anticompetitive outcomes relative to perfect enforcement.
1 Introduction:
While policies to increase market access have received much attention in
recent years, scant attention has been paid to the issue of implementation of
these policies. Consider, for example, the persistent calls to 'open up' the
'We thank Theresa Greaney, Bill Novshek and seminar participants at the Midwest
Trade Meetings, 1996, for helpful comments. Krishna is grateful for research support from
the National Science Foundation under grant No. FBR9-9320825, and Roy and Thursby
gratefully acknowledge support from the Purdue CIBER Technology Transfer Initiative.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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Japanese market by negotiating 'voluntary' minimum market share targets
for U.S. firms in Japan. Though there is still considerable debate about the
desirability of instituting such VIEs, the problem of implementation has never
surfaced as being important. Irwin (1994, pg. 65) notes that' ... the United
States never seems concerned about the mechanism by which "voluntary"
bilateral agreements are carried out and acts as if the foreign government
can solve the problem by fiat.'
Since it is well understood that enforcement is critical to the success of
any results oriented policy, it is somewhat surprising that implementation
per se, has been ignored. While Ethier and Horn (1993) and Cronshaw and
Markusen (1995), among others, examine results oriented policies Greaney
(1995) specifically incorporates the problem of implementation in her anal-
ysis. In her model, the government enforces the market share agreement by
threatening the home firm with a financial penalty in the event the import
target is not met. Nonetheless, neither this, nor other studies of VIEs, ex-
amine alternative methods of implementing market share requirements.1 In
reality, there are a number of ways of implementing a market share require-
ment, and the effects of the requirement depend critically on the details of
the implementation procedure used.
Understanding these effects is important, since unlike VERs, no obvi-
ous procedure comes to mind for implementing a VIE.2 An implementation
procedure that is feasible for one market may not be viable for another.
For instance, setting minimum physical requirements on the use of imported
intermediate goods, say semiconductors, may be a viable method of imple-
mentation when the number of purchasing firms is smal1.3 Such an imple-
mentation scheme would, however, be impossible to apply to the case of a
final good demanded by many small agents, and, even when feasible, such a
mechanism may have undesirable effects.
In this paper, we examine the use of tax/subsidy instruments to enforce
market share requirements. While there are a number of instruments that
lSee Dinopoulos and Kreinin (1990), Irwin (1993), Helpman and Krugman (1989),
Kowalczyk (1994), Bjorksten (1994) and Nakamura (1995).
2The use of quotas is an obvious way to implement a VER since the export-
ing/importing country's government can physically monitor the exact amounts of the
good leaving/entering the country, putting an end to the outflow/inflow the moment the
quantitative ceiling is reached.
3Tyson (1992, pg. 111-112) suggests that this was what was done in the first semicon-
ductor agreement.
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could be used, taxes/subsidies are feasible in a wide range of environments
where direct control is not. The tax/subsidy schemes that we consider reveal
the importance of the sequence of moves between firms and the government,
and they capture, albeit loosely, some aspects of MITI's handling of the semi-
conductor VIE. In particular, we consider taxes/subsidies that are set before
firms make their strategic choices, as well as those which are imposed only
if market outcomes violate the market share requirement. In the latter case,
firms know that a violation of the market share target will, with some prob-
ability, trigger either a tax on the Japanese product or a subsidy on the U.S.
good. The introduction of uncertainty attempts to capture MITI's imperfect
monitoring of the VIE target in the semiconductor case and yields equilibrium
outcomes where the U.S. firm's market share can (ex post) fall short of the
mandated minimum (both of which are well documented in the semiconduc-
tor VIE).41t also allows us to demonstrate that some degree of imprecision in
implementing the target engenders less anticompetitive outcomes relative to
perfect enforcement - perhaps, one reason behind the Japanese government's
perpetual opposition to exact market shares in any VIE negotiation.
We show that a timing framework where governments choose tax/subsidy
levels to implement market share requirements after firms have made their
strategic decisions, but before markets clear, imparts incentive effects to
tax/subsidy policy that are similar to those found with quotas/VERso Such
effects are absent from the existing literature on tax/subsidy policy, which
with the exception of Carmichael (1987) and Gruenspecht (1988), has con-
sistently adhered to a timing structure where governments are first movers.5
In keeping with that tradition, Greaney (1995) compares an import subsidy
when the government moves first, with a VIE (enforced by a penalty threat)
when the government moves second. She finds the two instruments have
opposite effects on price, with the VIE raising prices. Our analysis suggests
4Both Irwin (1996) and Greaney (1995) discuss the continual seesawing of the U.S.
market share below the 20 percent mark before finally climbing to just above the target
in the fourth quarter of 1992.
5 Carmichael (1987) is the first to investigate an alternative timing framework where
firms' pricing decisions precede government's choice of export subsidy levels. Citing evi-
dence from practices followed by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to rationalize the sequence
of government and firm actions, he shows that the rent seeking behavior of the firms
yields positive export subsidies in equilibrium. This departure from the Eaton and Gross-
man (1986) result that first mover governments should tax the exports of Bertrand firms
is again observed in Gruenspecht's (1988) model with big ticket differentiated products
where governments set subsidy levels after firms choose prices.
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that this distinction is somewhat misleading since a VIE can be enforced by
an import subsidy, and if the subsidy is triggered by a violation of the market
share target, firms with market power will have an incentive to raise price.
In the case of a tax used to implement the VIE, our results are similar to
Greaney's with the exception that in our model the VIE affects the strategic
behavior not only ofthe Japanese firm but also that ofthe U.S. firm. Greaney
assumes the Japanese government moves only after market shares have been
observed - an assumption that leaves the U.S. firm's behavior unchanged
and removes the kinds of strategic aspects of interest to us. On the other
hand, her scheme has the decided advantage that the home government can
implement the VIE with a minimum of information. In contrast, our ex post
subsidyjtax imposes substantial informational requirements on the part of
the government.6 Thus, since the government moves after firms set prices
but before market shares are realized, successful implementation necessitates,
for instance, perfect information regarding the demand functions. However,
the assumption that governments face no informational constraints is not
uncommon and characterizes most of the literature on strategic trade policy,
e.g., Brander and Spencer (1985).7
It can be argued that our ex post subsidy accords better with MITI's
actual handling of the semiconductor VIE than does the ex post tax on
Japanese producers. As is well documented by Irwin (1996, pg. 53), MITI
exercised its influence more on the demand side by trying to force Japanese
firms (most of which were themselves semiconductor producers) to purchase
more foreign chips. In fact, MITI's early efforts in 1987 to boost prices by
directing domestic semiconductor producers to reduce output were shot down
by the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we look at the
obvious ways of implementing VIEs, namely, via the use of taxes and sub-
sidies when governments can precommit to their policies. Section 3 then
identifies the kinds of incentive effects at work when governments are second
movers. In order to clearly isolate the incentive effects of each instrument -
tax and subsidy - on each of the firms, we first consider situations of one-
sided market power and, later, combine the analyses to study the case of
two-sided market power. When a subsidy on the U.S. product is used by
6We are grateful to Theresa Greaney for pointing this out.
7See, also, Brainard and Martimort (1992) for a discussion of the high informational
requirements of strategic trade policy.
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the Japan~se government to implement a minimum market share target, the
U.S. monopoly firm has an incentive to raise price in order to trigger the
subsidies. If monopoly power is on the Japanese side, the incentives are for
the Japanese firm to raise price to reduce the amount of the subsidy granted
or to eliminate it altogether. Under a tax policy, if market power is on the
U.S. side the incentives are for the U.S. firm to raise its price to trigger taxes
on the Japanese good. If power is on the Japanese side, then the incentive
is to, always, prevent taxes from being invoked by charging higher prices. In
Section 4, we put the two sides together and show that since price increases
are still matched by each firm, both taxes and subsidies result in higher prices
when firms have market power.
In Section 5, we present a simple but concrete numerical example to
highlight the differences in equilibrium outcomes when comparing an ex ante
policy with its ex post counterpart. By deriving prices, quantities, profits and
welfare in each case, the exercise yields valuable insights into the econClmic
effects of the various policies and helps rank them in terms of desirability
from the Japan~se and U.S. standpoints. For our example, instruments im-
posed ex post with some degree of imprecision engender less anticompetitive
outcomes and higher profits for the Japanese firm than those which are per-
fectly enforced. To the extent that this result generalizes, it could explain
the Japanese government's continued opposition to exact market shares in
any VIE negotiation. Section 6 offers concluding comments.
2 Implementation Through Taxes or Subsi-
dies:
While there may exist a number of different ways to implement market share
requirements, we focus on the instrument of tax/subsidy as a natural policy
to consider over a wide range of environments. Consider as an illustrative
example the case where the U.S. negotiates a market access requirement with
Japan. If a minimum market share for U.S. firms is the form of the market
access requirement, a reasonable way to implement it may be to either tax
Japanese firms until their sales fall enough for the market share of U.S. firms
to attain the target specified, or to subsidize U.S. firms until their sales rise
enough for the market share requirement to be met. While both methods
appear reasonable ways of implementing this policy, in both the tax case and
5
the subsidy case the timing of moves is critical to the nature of the outcomes
that obtain. In particular, when there exists some degree of market power,
allowing governments to set tax/subsidy levels after firms have made
their strategic choices (but before markets clear) gives rise to incentive
effects that are absent with the traditional timing scheme.
The literature has found some support for a second mover role of govern-
ments in real world settings. In fact, the timing scheme used in Carmichael
(1987) is identical to our ex post scheme in that the governments set subsidy
levels taking the firm prices as given, and the prices faced by consumers are
the subsidy ridden 'effective' prices. Goldberg and Knetter (1995) provide
evidence of a similar timing structure in the implementation of the Export
Enhancement Program (EEP) for agricultural commodities, namely, wheat:
U.S. exporters first submit bids specifying the price, quantity and quality
of wheat (already negotiated with the foreign country) to be delivered; the
Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) then examines these bids and approves
the subsidies if the quoted price is greater than the minimum acceptable
price and the bonus is smaller than the maximum allowable bonus. In the
interests of competition, both the minimum price and the maximum bonus
are kept unknown to the firms, i.e., there is a positive probability that the
EEP subsidy is not granted. While neither of these examples involves market
share targets per se, this sequence of moves seems to be the most natural
when examining VIEs. Further, our scheme has the added merit of captur-
ing the real world concern that if firms anticipate their behavior will affect
government policy, this anticipation must alter their strategic behavior. The
next subsection discusses the issue of timing in greater detail and provides
some justification for the specific timing structure used in this paper.
2.1 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Taxes and Subsidies:
The behavior of firms when faced with these kinds of taxes and subsidies
is very different depending on whether they think and act like these are
given to them, or whether they think and act like these taxes/subsidies can
be affected by their own behavior. In the former case, firms will not ask
how changes in their behavior will change the taxes/subsidies offered by the
government. In the latter case they will. The difference in the two cases
can be thought of, at a formal level, as a difference in timing assumptions
made. If the government chooses its tax/subsidy level first - what we call
ex ante policy - then firms who subsequently decide on their behavior must
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take the government's choices as given. The government can look forward
and take account of how its choices affect the choices made by firms. If on
the other hand, firms decide what to do first, and then government chooses
its taxisubsidy level - what we call ex post policy - the government must
take the firms' decisions as given while firms look forward and take account
of hmv their behavior affects the government's behavior. Which timing as-
sumption is appropriate depends on the ability of the government or the firm
to precommit to its decision variable(s).
If taxes and subsidies are set ex ante, the analysis is trivial. Whatever
be the market· structure, the government looks forward and calculates the
tax on Japanese firms or the subsidy on U.S. firms, or, even possibly, a
combination of the two, which results in the market share requirement being
met. If, for example, there is a single foreign and a single domestic firm
competing in prices and producing differentiated goods that are substitutes
for one another, and if demand is linear, then the best response functions
of the U.S. firm B2(Pl), and the Japanese firm B 1 (P2), can be depicted as
in Figure 1.8 The equilibrium firm (and consumer) prices are given by the
intersection of the best response functions, and their relative slopes are as
shown to ensure stability of equilibrium. The combination of consumer prices
which result in a market share for the U.S. firm at the free trade level can be
depicted by an upward sloping line EE, going through the equilibrium price
pair and lying between the two best response functions. 9
If a larger market share for the U.S. is required by the market share rule,
it can be depicted by a line to the right of EE such as MM. Now this higher
market share can be attained by setting a tax on the Japanese firm. As the
tax results in the Japanese firm setting a higher price for any given U.S.
price, this tax must move the Japanese firm's best response function to the
right to go through the point C.
Alternatively, this higher U.S. market share can be attained by giving
a subsidy per unit to the U.S. firm which moves its best response function
8 As usual, the best response function for firm 1 (firm 2) is its profit maximizing price
given the price chosen by firm 2 (firm 1).
9In the case of linear demand, the locus of consumer price combinations (pf, p~) sat-
isfying a market share constraint of k (0 < k < 1) with equality is represented by the
t · C C h (l-k)a2- ka , (l-k)c+kb d h d d requa Ion P2 = 'T/o + 'T/IPI were 7]0 = (l-k)b+kc' 'T/l = (l-k)b+kc ' an t e eman lor
good i is qi(pf ,pf) = ai - bpf + cpf; b > c> 0, ai > 0; i = 1,2; j i= i. It is easy to verify
that this is the equation of a straight line steeper than 2's best response but flatter than
1's best response.
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down and to the right through the point A.lO Notice that the two imple-
mentation procedures result in very different consumer prices. Consumer
prices are raised by the scheme when implemented by a tax and reduced by
it when implemented by a subsidy. Note, also, that the appropriate mix of
tax and subsidy policies can, by shifting both firms' best response functions
accordingly, realize any point on M M lying between A and C.
Now consider ex post taxes and subsidies. In a situation where the
government wants to implement market access but cannot precommit to
a tax/subsidy level there is considerable room for strategic behavior on the
part of the firms. For instance, a government may announce that while it is
serious about ensuring that the market share requirement is met, it will not
intervene actively unless free market forces continue to violate the market
share targets. In such settings, firms can exploit the fact that their actions
influence the government's choice of policies. Much of the concern in the real
world about the effect of market share requirements has to do with how their
presence will influence the behavior of firms. Such issues involve considera-
tions of strategic interaction and cannot be analyzed within the ex ante policy
framework. These questions can, however, be addressed meaningfully within
the context of ex post tax/subsidy policy. Consequently, an understanding
of the effects of such policies is important and relevant.
3 Ex Post Policies with One-Sided Market
Power:
The easiest way to develop some intuition about how ex post policy, geared
towards implementing market share targets, affects firms' incentives is to
consider situations of one-sided market power, i.e., either the Japanese or
the U.S. firm has market power but not both. Let us assume that demand
is linear, products are differentiated, firms are risk neutral and that the
perfectly competitive firms make identical products. There are, then, four
simple combinations of policy regime and market structure to consider:
(a) Subsidy policy with a U.S. monopoly firm and a competitive Japanese
industry,
(b) Subsidy policy with a Japanese monopoly firm and a competitive U.S.
lOThis is the type of subsidy that Greaney (1995) considers when comparing a "VIE"
with an import subsidy.
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industry,
(c) Tax policy with a U.S. monopoly firm and a competitive Japanese
industry,
(d) Tax policy with a Japanese monopoly firm and a competitive U.S.
industry.
The above serve the purpose of showing that even within such simple
structures, ex post tax/subsidy policies create important incentive effects
that are absent in their ex ante counterparts.
3.1 Subsidy policy with a U.S. monopoly firm and a
competitive Japanese industry:
First consider the incentive effects under (a). Recall that the goods made
in the two countries are imperfect substitutes for each other and that the
Japanese industry is behaving competitively and pricing at marginal cost.
The U.S. firm has monopoly power and has a first mover advantage over the
Japanese government. It understands that if it charges a price such that
demand for its product at this price violates the market share constraint, it
will be given the subsidy per unit needed to meet the pre-specified market
share. In this situation, the U.S. firm has an incentive to raise price as high
as possible, to infinity, as there are no limits on its ability to exploit the
government. To make the problem bounded, assume the Japanese govern-
ment announces that whenever the market share constraint is violated the
U.S. firm will be subsidized stochastically such that for any Japanese price,
a higher divergence from the market share satisfying U.S. price will be asso-
ciated with a lower probability of the subsidy being granted. l1 We introduce
uncertainty to capture the notion that a government's enforcement of a VIE
target may be less than perfect. Uncertainty also helps to mitigate the U.S.
firm's rent seeking incentives because, intuitively, some degree of imprecision
should reduce either firm's power to strategically exploit the VIE target.
This is trivially true for the U.S. firm in the case of a subsidy because under
certainty it has an incentive to charge an infinitely high price. 12
llThis can limit the U.s. firm's rent-seeking ability since the incentive to charge an
arbitrarily high price is dampened by the small probability of getting the subsidy.
12Further, even if an upper bound is placed on the U.S. firm's price, complete certainty
regarding that bound leads to excess strategic maneuvering by the Japanese firm. For
instance, if we use the Carmichael (1987) type of constraint where the subsidy is revoked
with certainty whenever the U.S. firm prices above its ordinary best response, the Japanese
9
Before proceeding to the formal analysis, some explanations regarding
notation are in order. In this case, the competitive Japanese firm price PI, is
always equivalent to the consumer price pf.13 However, the U.S. consumer
price pf equals the firm price P2 only when the subsidy is not realized. Oth-
erwise, when the subsidy is triggered, pf equals 92(PI) where 92(PI) is the
U.S. consumer price that makes the market share constraint just bind for
given Japanese firm price Pl. Hence, given firm prices (PI,P2), demand for
the U.S. good is q2(PI,92(PI)) if the subsidy is invoked and demand equals
Q2(PI,P2) if the subsidy is not granted. The locus of prices (PI,92(PI)) traces
out an upward sloping line M M (shown in Figure 3) such that the market
access constraint is binding only for firm prices lying above (and to the left)
of this line.
Now, let f(PI,P2) be the probability ofthe subsidy being granted for any
given price combination above MM. Assume that f(.) is nondecreasing in
PI and nonincreasing in P2. 14 Then, given constant unit cost T2, for price
combinations (PI,P2) above MM, we can define the U.S. firm's expected
profits as
7r2(PI,P2) f(')(P2 - T2)Q2(PI,92(PI)) + [1 - f(.)](P2 - T2)Q2(PI,P2)
- f(·)7r:(PI,P2) + [1- f(.)] 7r2(PI,P2)
where 7rJ!(PI,P2) is its profit at subsidized prices while 7r2(PI,P2) is its or-
dinary profit function. 7rJ!(PI,P2) and 7r2(PI,P2) are depicted in Figure 2.
Notice that for any given PI, 7rJ! (PI,P2) is represented by a straight line with
a constant positive slope of Q2(PI,92(PI)).15 Figure 2 also shows 7r2(PI,P2) for
the special case of constant probability of subsidy.
firm chooses its ordinary best response for U.S. prices above the free trade level, but
has an incentive to cut prices discontinuously for lower U.S. prices and charge a price
infinitesimally smaller than the one that just triggers the subsidy.
I3Henceforth, Pi will always denote the price charged by firm i while the consumer price
will be represented by pf. Recall that firms in the competitive industry (Japanese firms, in
this case) are identical in every respect and, hence, when good i is competitively produced,
Pi refers to the price of the representative firm.
I4For instance,we could use f(PI ,P2) = 1- h(p2 - g2(pt}) where hE (0,1), and h' (.) ~ 0
since we know that g; (.) > O. Henceforth, for simplicity, we shall assume' f (PI, P2) to be a
constant.
I5Given any PI, Q2(PI, g2 (pt}) is simply the demand for firm 2's product at the corre-
sponding point on the market share line MM. Q2(PI, g2(pt}) decreases continuously as Pi
increases and we move up along MM.
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Let B2(PI) denote the U.S. firm's ordinary best response in the absence
of a market share constraint. Define B2(PI) as the interior maximizer of
7f2(PbP2) which we assume bounded and concave. If the market share con-
straint is binding, the relevant profit function is 7i'2(PI,P2). On the other hand,
if the constraint is not binding, then the U.S. firm maximizes 1r2(PbP2) as
before. As 7i'2(Pl,P2) = 1r2(Pl,P2) at P2 = 92(PI), the overall profit function
is given by
1r2(PbP2) - 1r2(PbP2) for P2 ::; 92(PI)
7f2(PI,P2) for P2 > 92(PI)
In Figure 2, the bold line traces out 1r2(PbP2). Note that for prices to the
right of the P2 at which 1r2(PbP2) and 1r¥(Pl,P2) intersect, the market share
constraint is violated and 7f2(PI,P2) is the relevant profit for these prices.
Let the maximizer of 1r2(PbP2) be denoted by B2(PI). Then, there are three
possibilities to consider when deriving the U.S. firm's overall best response.
Given Japanese price Pb 1r2(.) and 7f2(') may intersect at a P2 where (i) both
are increasing in P2, (ii) both are decreasing in P2, or (iii) 1r2(') is decreasing
and 7f2(.) is increasing in P2. Recall that at P2 = 92(PI), 7f2(.) = 1r2(') and
7f2(.) has a larger slope than 1r2(')' Then, given the definition of 1r2(PI,P2),
we must have B2(PI) = B 2(PI) in case (i) and B2(PI) . B2(pd in case (ii).
In case (iii), B2(PI) equals either B 2(PI) or B2(pd depending on whether
the peak of7f2(') is higher or lower than that of 1r2(.). Case (i) occurs when
B2(PI) > 92(PI), case (ii) corresponds to situations where B 2 (PI) < 92(PI)
while case (iii) occurs when B2(PI) < 92(PI) < B2(PI)' Note that Figure 2 is
representative of case (i).
Figure 3 shows B 2(PI), B 2(PI) and the market share line M M in price
space. Note that for PI less than R~ (the PI at which M M intersects B2(PI))
we are in case (i), while case (ii) corresponds to PI greater than R~' (the PI
at which M M intersects B 2 (pd). Case (iii) occurs for Japanese prices in the
intermediate range between R~and R~/. Hence, from the above analysis, we
may depict the overall U.S. best response B2 (PI) by the bold line in Figure
3 which assumes one switchover point R~ at which B2(PI) jumps down from
B 2 (pI) to B 2 (PI)'
Now, let R I be any Japanese competitive price resulting in a free trade
equilibrium point A, unconstrained by any market share target. If the market
access requirement specifies a U.S. share greater than that in free trade, M M
must lie below B2(PI) at PI = R I , and so, R I must lie to the left of R~ in
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Figure 3. Clearly, this corresponds to case (i) and the U.S. firm maximizes
its profit by picking a price B 2(R I ), resulting in the equilibrium at point C.
In equilibrium, there is a positive probability of a subsidy being granted and
the U.S. firm charges a higher price compared to free trade.
3.2 Subsidy policy with a Japanese monopoly firm and
a competitive U.S. industry:
Now, consider the incentive effects under (b) where the Japanese firm has
the market power. Analogous to the previous case, given firm prices (PI,Pz),
demand for the Japanese good is ql (PI, 92 (PI)) if the subsidy is invoked and
demand equals ql(PI,P2) if the subsidy is not granted. The Japanese firm
knows that if the market share requirement is not met, a subsidy will be given
(stochastically) to the U.S. firms. In this event, demand for the Japanese firm
will fall, along with its profit. If, however, the Japanese firm were to raise its
price, it could reduce or eliminate the subsidy given to the U.S. firms, and
at least get a higher price in return for a lower demand. This is what creates
incentives for price increases by the Japanese firm even when the U.S. firms
are pricing competitively.
Proceeding similarly to the previous case, for any U.S. firm price P2,
let 91(P2) be the Japanese consumer price that satisfies the market share
constraint with equality. Then, given P2, unit cost TI and the probability of
subsidy f(.), the Japanese firm's expected profit function for prices to the
left of M Mis:
7r1(PI,PZ) f(·)(PI - TI)QI(PI,92(PI)) + [1 - f(·)](PI - TI)QI(PI,P2)
- f(.)7rf(PI) + [1 - f(.)] 7rI(PI,P2)
7rl(PI,PZ) is the Japanese firm's ordinary profit function while 7rf(pd is its
profit at the subsidized prices (PI,92(PI)), and equals its ordinary profit at
the corresponding point on the M M line. For given Pz, note that the first
derivative of 7rf(PI) is greater than that of 7rl(PI,PZ) at PI = 91(PZ)' i.e.,
on the M M line, since demand at the subsidized prices is more inelastic
than ordinary demand. Since 7rI(PI, pz) is a convex combination of 7rf (PI)
and 7r1(PI,P2) and f(.) is constant, the derivative of 7r1 (PI, P2) must also be






+ (1 - J)fuap
7r
, where j E (0,1) is a constant and !!.:.:..J...a
7rL > fua
7r at
PI I I PI PI
PI =gl(PZ).
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7rl(Pl,P2) and ?f1(PI, P2).
The Japanese firm's overall profit function is given by
7rl(PI,P2) = 7rl(Pl,P2) for PI 2: 9I(P2)
= ?fI(PI,P2) for PI < 91(P2)
7rI(PI,P2) is shown as the bold curve in Figure 4. Note that, now, for
prices less than the PI at which 7rf(PI) and 7rI(PI,P2) intersect, the market
share constraint is violated and ?f1(pI, P2) is the relevant profit. Let.81(P2)
be the maximizer of 1rl(PI,P2)' Again, we have three cases to consider in
deriving the Japanese firm's overall best response. Given U.S. price P2, 7rl(')
and ?fI(') may intersect at a PI where (i) both are increasing in PI, (ii) both
are decreasing in PI, or (iii) 7r1(.) is decreasing and ?f1(.) is increasing in Pl.
Then, from the definition of 7rl (PI, P2), we must have .81(P2) = B 1 (P2) in case
(i) and .81(P2) = B I(P2) in case (ii). In case (iii), .81(P2) equals 91 (P2), i.e., the
Japanese firm prices along MM. Case (i) occurs when B I(P2) > 91 (P2) , case
(ii) corresponds to situations where B 1 (P2) < 91 (P2) while case (iii) occurs
when B I(P2) < 91 (P2) < B 1(P2). Figure 4 corresponds to the situation in
case (ii).
Now, consider Figure 5 which shows B I(P2), B I(P2) and the market share
line M M in price space. As drawn, the Japanese firm's profit, as we move up
along M M, increases up to the point D (where an iso-profit curve is tangent
to M M) and then decreases. For U.S. prices less than R~ (the P2 at which
M M intersects B1(P2)) we are in case (i) and the best response is to choose
BI(P2). For P2 greater than R~ (the P2 on MM corresponding to the price
R~ which maximizes 7rf(Pl)), we are in case (ii) and the Japanese firm is
best off pricing along B 1 (P2). Note that for P2 2: R~' (the P2 at which BI(P2)
intersects R~), B I(P2) must lie to the left of B I(P2). Finally, for prices in the
intermediate range between R~ and R~, 7rl (PI, P2) is decreasing in PI while
7rr(Pl) is increasing in PI at 9l(P2). Hence, 7rl(') may be increasing - case
(iii) with .8l (P2) = 9l(P2) - or decreasing - case (ii) with .8l (P2) = B l (P2).
Since ?fl (.) is a convex combination of 7rl(Pl,P2) and 7rf(Pl), it is likely to
be increasing for prices close to R; but is likely to be decreasing for prices
close to R~. This, in turn, suggests that .81(P2) lies along the M M line
for prices close to R~ and lies on B l (P2) for prices close to R~. The overall
Japanese best response depicted by the bold line in Figure 5 is drawn under
the assumption that B 1 (P2) intersects M M at prices (HI, H2).
In Figure 5, suppose the U.S. good is priced competitively at R2 and the
market share target is greater than the free trade level. Then at R2 , M M
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must lie to the right of B I(P2) and must intersect B I(P2) at some point E
as depicted. We are then in case (ii) and the Japanese firm prices along
B I (P2) resulting in an equilibrium at point C. Compared to the free trade
equilibrium at A, the ex post subsidy policy yields a higher Japanese price
and a (stochastically) lower consumer price for the U.S. goodY
3.3 Tax policy with a U.S. monopoly firm and a com-
petitive Japanese industry:
Turning to tax policy, consider (c). The ordinary best response function
B 2(PI), and the market share constraint M M, are as depicted in Figure 6.
Note that, analogous to the previous subsidy policy cases, M M must again lie
to the right of the point where the competitive Japanese price RI intersects
B2(PI) since we are considering a market share requirement set above the
free trade level. However, in contrast to the subsidy case, the analysis is
carried out with a deterministic tax, i.e., perfect enforcement of the VIE is
assumed. The motivation is to emphasize that it is the timing of moves, and
not the uncertainty, which determi~es the nature of the realized outcomes. In
particular, an ex post tax/subsidy instrument is always more anticompetitive
in its effects than its ex ante counterpart.18
When the Japanese competitive price is R I , the U.S. firm has an incen-
tive to raise its price in response to the tax policy. By raising its price, it
can ensure that its market share falls below the required level, triggering a
tax on the Japanese industry which pulls up the real price to consumers of
the Japanese good in tandem with the U.S. price along MM. The profit
maximizing point along M M for the U.S. firm is the tangency point at D.
Hence, when the Japanese price is RI, the U.S. firm is best off choosing to
invoke taxes on the Japanese firms, which restricts their ability to compete in
their own market, and allows the U.S. firm to further enhance its monopoly
power. It charges a price p!f that is greater than the free trade price and
that results in an equilibrium at point C. Notice that the incentive effects of
17If the competitive U.S. price lies between R; and R2 , the ex post subsidy policy results
in an unchanged U.s. price, a higher Japanese price and a zero subsidy in equilibrium.
18The analysis with a stochastic tax is analogous to that in the subsidy case and results
in best responses that are similar in nature. In fact, the equilibrium outcomes with a
stochastic tax are explicitly calculated for the example in section 5, allowing for comparison
with the deterministic tax.
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the tax results in behavior on the U.S. firm's part that is similar in nature
to its pricing strategy under a VER on the rival good. (See Krishna, 1989).
Alternatively, it can choose not to invoke taxes on the Japanese industry
and get the highest profit it can for this option. It compares its maximum
profit from not invoking taxes with the maximum profit it can get by trig-
gering taxes. It will choose not to invoke taxes on the rival industry if the
Japanese price is high enough, and will trigger taxes otherwise. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 6, where the U.S. firm's best response is depicted by the
bold line. Note that it is discontinuous at PI = ill where the profits from its
two options are equal. I9
3.4 Tax policy with a Japanese monopoly firm and a
competitive U.S. industry:
Finally, consider (d) where the Japanese firm has the market power and is
taxed whenever the market share target is violated. Now, for any U.S. price
P2, the Japanese firm will never want to charge a price to the left of M M
since the resulting tax raises its consumer price to the corresponding point
on MM. Consequently, it is better off raising its price to lie on M M and at
least getting the benefit of a higher price. Thus, its best response to any U.S.
price can never lie to the left of MM. This best response is depicted by the
bold line in Figure 7. Again, if M M represents a U.S. market share greater
than the free trade level, M M lies to the right of A and the tax policy raises
the Japanese price from that at A to that at C. Note that the Japanese
firm's best response is reminiscent of the case of a VER on its product.
4 Ex Post Policy with Two-Sided Market Power:
The effect of two-sided market power can be thought of as combining the ele-
ments of the analysis so far. If, for example, we consider the implementation
of a minimum market share using a subsidy on the U.S. firm, then two-sided
market power can be thought of as superimposing the best response of a
U.S. firm having market power, case (a) and Figure 3 above, on the best re-
sponse function of a Japanese firm having market power, case (b) and Figure
5 above. This is done in Figure 8 where the best responses for the Japanese
19It can be verified that when Pl = ih, the U.S. firm's best strategy is to randomize
between p¥and p~(see Krishna, 1989, for a similar proof).
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and U.S. firms are labelled fh (P2) and B2(PI) respectively. When the U.S.
firm alone exercises market power it has an incentive to raise prices in the
hope of triggering subsidies. On the other hand, when the power is on the
Japanese side, there is an incentive to increase prices to reduce the amount
of the subsidy, as well as to receive a higher price for its product should the
demand lowering subsidy occur. Since price increases are still matched by
each firm (strategic complements), putting both the sides together results in
higher prices compared to the free trade equilibrium.
If we consider the implementation of a minimum market share using taxes
on the Japanese firm, then we need to superimpose the best response of a
U.S. firm having market power, case (c) and Figure 6 above, on the best
response function of a Japanese firm having market power, case (d) and
Figure 7 above. Doing so gives Figure 9.20
Observe that the two best response functions do not intersect. There is
no pure strategy equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibrium consists of
the U.S. firm mixing between the two points pt and p!f in Figure 6, and
the Japanese firm charging 'PI. The form of the equilibrium is analogous to
that in Krishna (1989). The U.S. firm can either set a high price and trigger
a tax on the Japanese firm which raises its price, or choose to ignore that
option, and price along its old best response. It will ignore the option when
the Japanese price is high enough and use it otherwise. When the Japanese
firm charges fJ}, the U.S. firm is indifferent between its two options and is
willing to mix between them in any way needed. The mixing is designed
to make the Japanese firm choose to charge Pl. In equilibrium, for market
shares close to free trade levels, the prices charged are higher. The profits of
the U.S. firm are higher in equilibrium.
Hence, both the obvious schemes - taxes and subsidies - to use in im-
plementing market share requirements are seen to carry adverse incentive
baggage with them in that, either scheme tends to raise prices charged by
firms.
20 Alternatively, if we were to consider a stochastic tax, the situation would be similar in
nature to the subsidy case. In fact, the example in the next section depicts the outcomes
with either type of tax, demonstrating that a non-deterministic instrument is less collusive
than a deterministic one.
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5 An Example:
This section presents a simple but concrete numerical example to highlight
the importance of the timing of moves between government and firms in the
presence of a minimum market share target. By focusing on the differences
in equilibrium outcomes when comparing ex ante policies with their ex post
counterparts, the exercise yields valuable insights into the economic effects
of the various policies and helps rank them in terms of desirability from the
Japanese government's standpoint. Further, by examining an alternative tax
instrument, viz. the ex post stochastic tax, we demonstrate that some degree
of imprecision in enforcing the VIE target makes for less anticompetitive
outcomes. 21
Using linear demand and a constant probability of subsidy/tax of 0.2 in a
duopolistic setting, we consider a case where the U.S. firm initially has 46%
of the Japanese market prior to the U.S. government's successful negotiation
of a 60% VIE target. 22 Table 1 reports the resulting firm prices, consumer
prices, outputs, profits, subsidy expenditures, tax revenues, Japanese con-
sumer surplus and Japanese welfare across six different policy regimes: no
VIE target, ex ante subsidy, ex ante tax, ex post subsidy, ex post certain
tax and ex post stochastic tax. 23 Note that U.S. welfare is simply the U.S.
firm's profit. Also note that, in this example, though the equilibria (in firm
prices) are in pure strategies, one should be very careful when comparing the
ex post policies with their ex ante counterparts since in the ex post case, the
consumer prices (and, hence, quantities, profits and welfare) reported in the
table are only expected values.
21 While the formal analysis has considered only ex post deterministic taxes, an ex post
stochastic tax can readily be shown to yield best responses similar in nature to those found
in the ex post subsidy setting.
22The example uses the demand structure qi = ai - bpi + cpj,i,j = 1,2;j -=I i; with
a1 = 5, a2 = 4, b = 2, c = 1; and costs of production T1 = T2 = 1. These demands are
derived from the underlying utility function U(q1, q2) = a1q1 +a2q2-({3qr+2'"'1q1q2+{3q~)/2
with ai = (ai/3 - an)/({32 - '"'12), b = (3/({32 - '"'12) and c = '"'I/({32 - '"'12). Consumer surplus
with prices (P1,P2) and quantities (ql,q2) is given by U(Q1,q2) - (7f1 +7f2). See Singh and
Vives (1984) for details. Similar qualitative results hold for different parameter values,
and also for the case where the probability of subsidy/tax is allowed to vary with firm
prices.
23Japanese welfare is measured as the unweighted sum of consumer surplus, firm profit
and tax revenues in the case of a tax instrument, and as the unweighted sum of consumer
surplus and firm profit less subsidy expenditures in the case of a subsidy instrument.
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At the very outset, we notice that an ex post subsidy results in higher
consumer prices than an ex ante subsidy: (2.37, 2.16) compared to (2.10,
1.40). In fact, unlike the ex ante subsidy, the ex post subsidy actually in-
creases consumer prices above free trade levels! The Japanese consumers
are better off under the ex ante subsidy with a consumer surplus of 7.66
(compared to 5.05 under the ex post subsidy). However, from the Japanese
government's viewpoint, the ex post subsidy dominates the ex ante subsidy
in terms of profit: (3.32 compared to 2.42), and subsidy expenditure: the
ex ante subsidy costs a whopping 4.13 while the ex post subsidy only costs
.34! In fact, the unweighted sum of consumer surplus and profit less subsidy
expenditures assigns a higher value to the ex post subsidy: welfare is 8.03
under the ex post subsidy but is only 5.96 with the ex ante subsidy. Never-
theless, the Japanese government may prefer the ex ante subsidy if consumer
surplus is weighted more heavily in national welfare. The U.S. firm is better
off with the ex ante subsidy than with the ex post subsidy. 24
The tendency for prices to rise more when firms move first is again found
in the tax case. The ex post certain tax yields consumer prices of (3.14,2.54)
and consumer surplus of only 2.83 while the ex ante tax results in lower
prices of (2.80, 2.20) and a higher consumer surplus of 4.05. Since Japanese
profit plus tax revenue is larger with the ex ante tax, the ex ante tax clearly
dominates the ex post certain tax in terms of welfare. This serves to stress
the point that the price increases are caused by the timing of moves and not
by the uncertainty.
In fact, some degree of imprecision in the VIE's specification reduces the
extent to which the firms can strategically exploit the VIE and yields less
anticompetitive outcomes relative to the ex post certain tax. This is borne
out in Table 1, where firm and consumer prices are lower for both goods
with the ex post stochastic tax compared to the ex post certain tax. This
translates into a much higher Japanese consumer surplus of 4.79 with the ex
post stochastic tax relative to the low figure of 2.83 with the ex post certain
tax. Further, since Japanese profit plus tax revenue is also higher, Japanese
welfare is much higher with the ex post stochastic tax : 8.02 compared to
5.51. The intuition is that the average U.S. market share with the stochastic
tax is .49 (not shown in Table 1) and, so, the uncertain ex post tax is less
24 Note that consumer prices and outputs with a VIE and an import'subsidy in Greaney's
model correspond to those with an ex ante tax and an ex ante subsidy, respectively, in
our framework.
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restrictive than the certain ex post tax.25 However, not surprisingly, the U.S.
is better off with the ex post certain tax enjoying a welfare of 3.13 compared
to 2.49.
More interestingly, the ex post stochastic tax yields a higher consumer
surplus than the ex ante tax: 4.79 compared to 4.05: due to smaller consumer
prices: (2.47, 2.17) compared to (2.80, 2.20). Further, the higher profit plus
tax revenue for the Japanese firm implies a larger national welfare with the
stochastic tax and, consequently, the Japanese government would pick the ex
post stochastic tax if faced with a choice between a stochastic tax and an ex
ante tax. As for U.S. welfare, it continues to be better off with the ex post
certain tax compared to the ex ante tax.
How do the stochastic tax and ex post subsidy compare? While the
consumer price of the U.S. good is roughly the same for both, the ex post
subsidy produces a smaller price for the Japanese good. This is reflected
in a higher consumer surplus of 5.05 for the ex post subsidy. On the o~her
hand, Japanese profit plus tax revenue with the ex post stochastic tax is
greater than profit less subsidy expenditure for the ex post subsidy. Using
our measure of welfare, we find that the ex post subsidy is marginally superior
to the ex post stochastic tax in this example. Note that with either the ex post
subsidy or the ex post stochastic tax the actual U.S. market share realized
may fall short of the mandated minimum.
6 Conclusion:
The current U.S. preoccupation with negotiating minimum market share tar-
gets with the Japanese government has raised many questions regarding the
economic consequences of these targets. However, recent work to analyze
these questions has paid little attention to the implementation aspect, even
though it is well understood that enforcement is critical to the success of
any results-oriented policy. This paper explicitly considers tax and subsidy
instruments to implement minimum market share agreements and demon-
25Even if the stochastic tax policy were designed to yield an equilibrium average U.S.
market share of 60%, the ex post certain tax would still be dominated by the ex post
stochastic tax. For instance, an 85% VIE target implemented through an ex post tax with
a probability of .4 (not shown in Table 1), results in an average market share of 60% but
generates a higher consumer surplus and welfare: 4.11 and 6.67, respectively, compared to
the ex post certain tax.
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strates that their effects depend critically on the sequence of moves between
government and firms. In particular, when the home government can move
only after firms have made their strategic choices (ex post policy), both taxes
and subsidies create powerful incentives for firms to raise prices - incentive
effects that are absent in the traditional ex ante timing framework.
Under subsidy policy with monopoly power on the U.S. side, the incen-
tives are for the U.S. firm to raise price and trigger the subsidies. If monopoly
power is on the Japanese side, the incentives are for the Japanese firm to try
and ensure that the subsidies are not triggered since such an occurrence low-
ers sales without a compensatory high price. Thus, it raises price to prevent
subsidies (and reduce their amount) to the U.S. firms. In either case, under
the ex post timing structure, subsidies create incentives to raise prices. If
the minimum import requirement is implemented by a tax on the Japanese
good and market power is on the U.S. side, then the incentives are for the
U.S. firm to raise its price, triggering taxes on the Japanese good, which in
turn enhances demand for the U.S. firm's product and increases its profit. If
power is on the Japanese side, then the incentive is always to prevent taxes
from being invoked by charging higher prices. Here, too, a timing structure
with government as second mover produces incentives that result in higher
prices. Thus, both tax and subsidy schemes, in the presence of market power,
are anticompetitive in their effects. These incentive effects, while well doc-
umented for quotas/VERs, are not found in the literature on tax/subsidy
policy.
These anticompetitive effects are mitigated to some extent when the gov-
ernment's enforcement ability is less than perfect. Some degree of imprecision
in implementing the VIE target reduces the firms' power to strategically ex-
ploit the target and yields less anticompetitive outcomes - a fact which may
account, in part, for the Japanese government's steadfast opposition to pre-
cise numerical targets. Further, imperfect enforcement gives rise to situations
where the actual market share realized by the foreign firm falls short of the
VIE target - a phenomenon frequently observed in the case of the semicon-
ductor VIE. Hence, our framework captures, albeit loosely, some aspects of
MITI's handling of the semiconductor VIE.
Given the anticompetitive nature of the specific tax and subsidy instru-
ments considered so far, the natural question that arises is: 'are there situa-
tions in which an import target can be implemented without raising prices?'
This issue is examined in depth in Krishna, Roy and Thursby (1996) where
we show that such pro-competitive policies are indeed possible.
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Table 1.* Firm and consumer prices, quantities, profits, subsidy expenditures, tax
revenues, consumer surplus and welfare for const. probability .2 and VIE target 0.6
No VIE Ex ante Ex ante Ex post Ex post Ex post
target Subsidy Tax Subsidy Certain Tax Stoch. Tax
lap. firm price 2.27 2.10 1.80 2.37 3.00 2.39
U.S. firm price 2.07 2.65 2.20 2.28 2.54 2.17
lap. cons. price 2.27 2.10 2.80 2.37 3.14 2.47
U.S. cons. price 2.07 1.40 2.20 2.16 2.54 2.17
lap. quantity 2.53 2.20 1.60 2.43 1.25 2.23
U.S. quantity 2.13 3.30 2.40 2.04 2.07 2.13
lap. profit 3.21 2.42 1.28 3.32 2.50 3.11
U.S. profit 2.28 5.45 2.88 2.61 3.13 2.49
Subsidy expen. NA 4.13 NA .34 NA NA
Tax revenue NA NA 1.6 NA .18 .12
lap. cons. surplus 5.44 7.66 4.05 5.05 2.83 4.79
lap. welfare 8.66 5.96 6.93 8.03 5.51 8.02
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